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Abstract   
 
Competitive tendering of local bus services in Germany has received increased 
attention. Employing Seemingly Unrelated Regression analyses, we observe that prices 
have regionally varying determinants; for example, while prices throughout most of the 
federal state of Hesse increase over time, prices in the Munich area decrease. 
Optimisation of bus utilisation in general has a cost-decreasing impact, confirming that 
public transport authorities can reduce prices via adequate transport planning. 
Furthermore, Stochastic Frontier Analysis shows that tender prices in Hesse are slightly 
less efficient. Moreover we conclude that the public transport authority‟s experience has 
an efficiency-increasing impact which supports the introduction of overarching 
authorities. 
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1.0 Introduction  
Local public transport in Germany is a costly enterprise. Although European regulation 
(EC) No 1370/2007 appeared to mitigate the need for restructuring through the 
possibility of direct awards, the unexpected global recession has been a major factor 
affecting the public budgetary crisis. Moreover, the nation‟s constitutional goal to 
achieve balanced budgets in the period 2011 to 2020 adds urgency to the need for fiscal 
reform of public transport.  
Expecting diminishing capabilities of public co-funding, the application of instruments 
to improve efficiency is more important than ever for public transport authorities 
(PTAs). Many international studies confirm significant efficiency improvements when 
introducing competitive tendering to a previously monopoly situation (see among others 
Alexandersson et al. (1998), Hensher and Wallis (2005) and Sharaby and Shiftan 
(2008)). Thus, competitive tendering has received increased attention in recent years in 
Germany, especially where there is no municipal ownership of the incumbent operator. 
The major areas of competitive tendering activity are the federal state of Hesse 
including Frankfurt on the Main, and the agglomeration areas of Munich, Hamburg and 
Mannheim.  
While tendering has shown positive results internationally, securing these results in the 
long run is difficult (for example, see Hensher and Wallis (2005)). Little is known about 
the factors that influence tender prices and the differences in tender prices. Knowledge 
of such factors will enable PTAs to set effective tendering conditions and to secure 
public transport services in an environment of decreasing public budgets. This paper 
aims to identify the influential factors and differences by analysing a unique and 
comprehensive data set of 157 observations for the period 1997 to 2009 explicitly 
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collected for our research. We choose not to develop a cost function for bus operators, 
and instead focus on identifying the tendering conditions which, if properly set by 
PTAs, will help operators to improve efficiency and reduce costs.  
We apply several regression techniques to differentiate between a general cost-impact 
and an efficiency-impact only affecting single observations, for example, potential 
overcompensations or winners‟ curses. We also examine whether price and efficiency 
differences exist between the regions, since market organisation and tendering policies 
differ significantly among the regions (see Beck 2010). 
Numerous papers have analysed efficiency in public transport services by bus in a 
general perspective based on data of operators (usually annual reports), among them 
Brons et al. (2005), Dalen and Gómez-Lobo (2003), Farsi et al. (2006) and Walter 
(2010). Fewer authors have analysed the drivers of efficiency in detail (for example, 
Miller (1970) for some US cities). Wolanski (2009) compared the efficiency levels of 
direct awards and competitive tendering and analysed the drivers of efficiency for the 
Polish market. He found that PTAs will reach optimum efficiency levels when selecting 
contract terms between one to eight years; assigning a volume appropriate for small- 
and medium-sized operators; and by tendering numerous services in one area to support 
a dynamic market development. Wolanski confirms that tendering of public transport 
services results in considerable efficiency improvements.
1
 
To our knowledge, no efficiency analysis has been published that is based solely on 
competitive tendering observations. By examining the drivers of efficiency in this 
market and separating different developments in the regions, we provide a 
                                                 
1 The results of a comparison of several towns point to lower costs for services provided by private than by public 
operators. Nevertheless, public operators receiving part of their orders under the direct award procedure are able to 
tender services at lower than average prices. 
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comprehensive economic analysis that enables PTAs to realize further efficiency 
improvements in future tendering procedures.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the key 
characteristics of the data set and the explanatory variables, and explains our 
methodology to adjust prices for inflation, regionally differences in price levels, and 
subsidisation. Section 3 describes the SUR methodology and presents the results of our 
analyses with a special focus on regional developments. Section 4 describes the SFA 
methodology and the results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion and offers 
suggestions for future research? 
2.0 Data 
2.1 Database  
Although Germany‟s PTAs are obliged to publish a minimum amount of information 
(see §§ 17, 19 (2) and 23 Official German Contracting Terms for Award of Service 
Performance Contracts, Part A (VOL/A) 2009), comprehensive data on competitive 
tendering, including prices, remain unpublished, nor are official statistical data 
available. For these reasons we construct a database in three steps to enable 
sophisticated empirical analysis: (i) identification of all criteria deemed to influence the 
price; (ii) development of a questionnaire; and (iii) collection and verification of the 
data.  
A first catalogue of relevant criteria is developed based on a comprehensive literature 
review and our personal consulting experiences. The criteria are verified via interviews 
with thirty representatives of PTAs, operators, and consultants involved with 
competitive tendering of local bus services in Germany. The criteria are re-evaluated in 
a roundtable discussion with the Arbeitskreis Vergabe (AK Vergabe) der 
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Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der ÖPNV-Aufgabenträger in der Bundesvereinigung der 
kommunalen Spitzenverbände Deutschlands (BAG ÖPNV).
2
  
The questionnaire is drafted, again followed by a roundtable discussion with the AK 
Vergabe, and we pre-test it with several PTAs to identify potential problems and 
misleading questions. The final questionnaire is distributed to all German PTAs via the 
BAG ÖPNV.  
All major PTAs that have conducted numerous tendering procedures so far have 
provided data.
3
 The final step, the reliability check of the data, identifies and clarifies 
incomplete or questionable information. Altogether, the database contains quantitative 
and qualitative data for 112 criteria for n = 157 batches
4
 tendered by 16 PTAs in the 
period 1996 to 2009. Furthermore, we develop combined variables based on the 
collected criteria. The next two subsections discuss the dependent and relevant 
explanatory variables, and their designs, calculations, and expected influences.  
2.2 Dependent variables  
Analysing the factors with monetary impact in the competitive tendering market 
requires a sufficiently large and unbiased database. Our questionnaire asked PTAs to 
provide data on the price per vehicle kilometre to be paid by the PTA to the operator for 
batch i in the first contract year as a result of competitive tendering on a gross-cost basis 
(pi).
5
 When analysing this data our goal is to adjust any peculiarity with influence on the 
                                                 
2 The AK Vergabe is the workgroup for awarding within the BAG ÖPNV. The BAG ÖPNV is a joint association of 
local acting PTAs of the Deutscher Städtetag (German association of cities), the Deutscher Landkreistag (German 
association of rural districts) and the Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund (German association for small cities and 
towns). 
3 Special thanks go to all PTAs that provided data for this study. 
4 Also called lots or networks. 
5 Note that net-cost contracts are made comparable to gross-cost contracts by using their net subsidy payment plus the 
fare revenues of that batch. Furthermore, note that Pi in Table 1, which we define later, is different to pi. 
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price per vehicle kilometre beyond the influence of the PTAs. Doing so allows us to 
identify the true factors of influence of PTAs when setting their tendering conditions.  
Considering the observed period of thirteen years, the effect of inflation is a major bias 
that requires adjustment. To verify whether the consumer price index commonly used 
for reassessment in numerous studies fits with the real development of the operating 
costs for public bus transport services we develop our own index I to adjust pi 
adequately. This index is based on data provided by the Federal Statistical Office, 
expert interviews with bus operators, representatives of the bus industry, and PTAs, and 
it is complemented by our research into the different regional cost levels that arise from 
structural differences, such as schemes of public co-funding and wage rates.  
Total costs for an average batch are influenced by: (i) labour costs (LC, primarily bus 
driver costs); (ii) capital costs (VC, primarily vehicle investments); (iii) fuel or diesel 
costs (DC); and (iv) other costs (OC, primarily administrative or overhead costs). LCt, 
VCt, DCt and OCt represent the relevant index values for the public transport industry 
for a specific year t filled with data provided by the Federal Statistical Office. 
Our examination of the collective labour agreements for states where tendering data is 
available shows that labour costs differ significantly due to labour rates and effective 
hours (we define effective hours as the sum of working hours for which the driver is 
effectively available). We find that working hours per week range from 38.5 to 40, the 
amount of leave days range from 20 to 31, public holidays range from 9 to 13, and we 
also note the various arrangements for breaks. In addition, monthly salaries per bus 
driver at the junior level of seniority, for example, range from 27,135 Euros to 32,540 
Euros, whereas their development over time was in a similar range between the states. 
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Based on our examination we adjust LCt by up to 23 per cent via the different weighting 
factors per state.  
Regarding vehicle costs we find that a system of public co-funding for vehicle 
investments is effective in Bavaria
6
 and North Rhine-Westphalia. Thus, we need to 
adjust VCt by up to 50 per cent for these states. 
The index Ist necessary to adjust pi for batch i in state s in year t can be written as: 
ststststst OCDCVCLCI  05.01.015.07.0  (1) 
where 0.7, 0.15, 0.1 and 0.05 are the typical shares of total costs for an average batch 
according to experts and verified by our research. Figure 1 shows the real development 
over time t with IHE2009 representing point 1.0 since the analysis is based on 2009 
prices.
7
 We observe a significant difference between the development of the consumer 
price index CPIt of the Federal Statistical Office and the index values Ist per state, with a 
jump of IBYt due to the adjusted public co-funding of vehicles in Bavaria.
8
  
                                                 
6 Bavaria undertook reforms within our observation period. 
7 Note that the index for Rhineland-Palatine shows values similar to those for neighbouring Hesse; thus, Figure 1 
omitsthe less-relevant Rhineland-Palatinate. 
8 A simple OLS regression confirms that these index values show a correlation on a high significance level with the 
real development of the unadjusted prices per vehicle kilometre pi. 
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Figure 1: Development of the total costs indexes Ist  compared to the consumer price index CPIt 
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CPIt : Consumer Price Index for year t of the Federal Statistical Office 
: Index It for the federal state Hesse for year t (~similar to Rhineland-Palatine)
: Index It for the federal state Bavaria for year t
: Index It for the federal state North-Rhine Westphalia for year t
: Index It for the federal state Baden-Württemberg for year t
: Index It for the federal state Schleswig-Holstein for year t
Source: Own calculation 
Consequently our analysis below is based on Pi, being the adjusted price per vehicle 
kilometre for batch i originated in state s. We portion the set B of batches (i  B) into 
disjunct subsets Bst with UBst = B. For every Bst there exists a unique Ist. The adjusted 
price Pi for batch (i  B) is then given by  
Pi = (1 / Ist) × pi (2) 
 
for every i  Bst for every s and t.  
As shown in Table 1 Pi varies from 0.81 to 4.38 Euros. The mean price is 2.09 Euros. 
We also investigate the full price to be paid by the PTA per annum (p.a.) to the operator 
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per batch i, being FPi = Pi × vkmpai, where vkmpai is the volume of vehicle kilometres 
p.a. (vkm p.a.) per batch i.
9
 The mean value of FPi is 1.1 m Euros.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 157 observations and for main criteria 
  Mean Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
Price variables     
Adjusted price per vehicle kilometre (Pi) in € 2.09 0.50 0.81 4.38 
Full price per annum (FPi) in € 1,059,349 1,366,135 40,299 8,673,811 
Variables set by PTA     
Vehicle kilometres per annum (vkmpa)  508,970 599,962 9,200 3,706,757 
Number of lines (linesno) 4.10 4.06 1 21 
Number of vehicles (novehcl) 10.43 10.73 1 57 
Average vkmpa per bus (kmpervehcl) 50,540 23,145 9,200 191,833 
Labour agreement standard (declwage) 1. no requirements: 50, 2. closure of any labour agree-
ment with employees required: 79, 3. specific labour 
agreement set as minimum standard: 28  
     
Average length per bus in metres (lengthbus) 12.37 1.44 7 18 
Contract term in years (term) 6.51 1.83 1 8 
Security deposit in percent of FPi (deposit) 3.45 3.57 0 17 
Days of submission (submdays) 55.65 18.38 25 145 
Option for term extension foreseen? (extopt) no: 137; yes: 20 
Renewal of vehicles during term? (renewal) no, not necessary: 122; yes, renewal necessary: 35 
Revenue risk: contract type (revrisk) gross-cost contract: 145; net-cost contract: 12  
Structural variables beyond PTA influence     
Experience: specific number of the batch 
tendered by the PTA over time (expr) 
19.01 18.72 1 67 
Sum of experience: sum of all batches 
tendered by the PTA (exprsum) 
37.01 26.60 1 67 
Start of operations (startoyear) - - 1997 2009 
Number of bidders (bidders) 5.37 2.74 1 14 
Change of operator? (change) no: 43; yes: 114 
Winning bidder SME? (sme) no: 67, yes: 90 
Spatial type of transport service (spatial) 1. major city: 8, 2. medium-sized town: 3, 3. small town: 
15, 4. suburban: 21, 5. rural: 110 
Federal state (fedstate) HE: 72, BY: 67, SH: 10, BW: 4, NW: 3, RP: 1 
HE: Hesse, BY: Bavaria, SH: Schleswig-Holstein, BW: Baden-Württemberg, NW: North Rhine-
Westphalia, RP: Rhineland-Palatine; variable denotations are presented in italics, a full explanation is 
presented in the Appendix. 
Source: Own calculation 
                                                 
9 As vkmpa we count only those vkm p.a. provided on the specific lines of the batch according to the timetable 
usually set by the PTA. Other tours, for example, transfer between depot and start of a specific line, are excluded.  
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2.3 Explanatory variables  
To discover the conditions with a significant impact on price, we classify the 
independent variables in three groups according to the general contract conditions with 
influence on: (i) operators‟ productivity; (ii) the risk level for operators; and (iii) 
variables capturing other factors beyond the PTAs‟ direct influence. 
With respect to economies of scale, the chief factor in a contract is the volume tendered 
out. We theorise that it is a cost-decreasing influence when PTAs are able to increase 
the volume per batch or the volume per vehicle. An average batch in our database is 
characterised by a volume of four lines, 505,970 vkm p.a. and ten vehicles, yet there is 
much variation. The average vkmpa output per vehicle, a simple partial productivity 
measure, shows a mean volume of 50,540. Other conditions set by PTAs that probably 
limit operational flexibility of the winning bidder are assumed to have a price-increasing 
effect, most notably for labour agreements where the requirements set by PTAs are 
measured by an ordinal increasing scale. 
For analytical purposes we assume that different risks also affect price. The average 
extent of investment risk, measured by the average length per bus per observation, is 
assumed to have a price-increasing impact as a market exit barrier. The mean value 
shows that most of the buses used are standard 12-metre vehicles. The risk level for 
market exit influenced by the contract period set by PTAs in the tendering conditions 
that is available for depreciation is assumed to have a price-decreasing impact.  
Net-cost contracts, where the PTA decides that the revenue risk shall be borne by the 
operator, are assumed to have a price-increasing impact. We assume the same for the 
volume of deposits given by operators to PTAs as security. The duration between the 
date of the public call for tenders and the date of submission set by PTAs is assumed to 
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have a price-decreasing impact (the more time operators have to prepare and submit 
bids the lower the prices). Operators are assumed to need a sufficient period to develop 
a proper calculation; otherwise they must add a risk premium. Contract conditions set 
by PTAs that presuppose a renewal of vehicles during the contract period are assumed 
to have a price-increasing impact, also true for contract conditions that foresee PTAs‟ 
options to extend the contract period at the end of the contract term. 
Variables usually beyond the direct influence of PTAs, such as level of expertise of 
PTA, time, level of competition, and spatial aspects, are also assumed to have an impact 
on prices. To date, only a few PTAs have conducted numerous tendering procedures. 
The Münchner Verkehrs- und Tarifverbund GmbH (MVV) has the most experience, 
having undertaken sixty-seven tendering procedures in suburban Munich area since 
1996.
10
 Previous or a higher experience level is assumed to have a price-decreasing 
impact, which is also assumed for the start year of operations. 
Spatial aspects are measured by classifications of population density and transferred to 
an ordinal scale. Services in high density (city) areas (low ordinal scale) are assumed to 
be more expensive than services in low density (rural) areas (high ordinal scale). Most 
of the procedures analysed are in Hesse (73 observations or 46%), the only federal state 
to tender almost all bus services (see Beck 2010), as illustrated in Figure 2, which 
shows, too, that the average volume per batch is far lower in the Munich area than in 
Hesse. 
                                                 
10 These are the sum of all Bavarian observations. To date, no competitive tendering was observed for the Munich 
city area. 
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Figure 2: Distribution of number of batches and vkm p.a. by state 
100%
Vkm p.a.
79,908,208
0.1%8.3%
2.2%
69.1%
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0.6%6.4%
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RP (Rhineland-Palatine)
SH (Schleswig-Holstein)
NW (North-Rhine Westphalia)
HE (Hesse)
BY (Bavaria)
BW (Baden-Württemberg)
 
Source: Own calculation 
Analysing the level and structure of competition shows that, on average, five companies 
submit bids and that the incumbent is unable to regain the services in 114 of 157 cases. 
Small- and medium-sized enterprises (sme) which often claim diminishing opportunities 
to survive in this market, win fifty-seven per cent of the batches tendered (the highest 
success rates are in the Munich area).  
The number of bidders is assumed to have a price-decreasing impact. Indeed, a simple 
OLS regression confirms that the number of bidders has a clear price-decreasing effect, 
highly significant on a 99.9% level (see Appendix). Since the variable, bidders, depends 
on contractual and structural factors (see Augustin and Walter 2009 and Beck 2010), we 
omit it as an explanatory variable.  
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3.0 Seemingly unrelated regressions 
3.1 Methodology  
Simple OLS regression is potentially able to identify the determinants of prices in 
competitive tendering. However, after the regionalisation of local public transport 
during railway reform in 1996, the federal states are now responsible for their own local 
public transport policies, and many responsibilities are delegated to the county or 
communal level (for more details on the regionalisation and the current framework see 
Beck 2009a).  
This has important implications for the choice of the “right” regression technique: 
Clearly, the differences in the design of tenders, various price determinants, and other 
such factors cause us to consider a system of regression equations. In particular some 
structural factors may only be relevant in specific states or regions. We also bear in 
mind that our data set could inadvertently neglect some influential factors.  The 
topography of the service area may be an example for a cost driver not covered by the 
data set. Assuming that the error terms of our regression equations are correlated leads 
us to the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model (Zellner, 1962).
11
 
With a slight abuse of notation, the SUR model can be written as 
rirrirri xP    (3) 
where Pri represents the adjusted price per vehicle kilometre to be paid by the PTA to 
the operator for batch i in region r (which is located in state s), αr the region-specific 
intercepts, xri the matrix of explanatory variables with region-specific coefficient 
vectors βr and the error term ri. The number of explanatory variables is different 
                                                 
11 However, we did not assume that there is a spatial dependency measured by distances between service areas that 
determine tender prices. Hence, we do not pursue the path of spatial econometrics. 
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between regions, for example, because some variables exhibit no variation in some 
regions. 
In contrast to many applications of the SUR model (see for example Wooldridge, 2002, 
pp. 143 ff.), it is obvious that the number of observations per equation, hence region, is 
different in our analysis, because we use tendered batches as observations. Therefore we 
use the algorithm proposed by McDowell (2004) that allows us to estimate a system of 
SURs with unbalanced equations using Stata‟s xtgee command. For this command, the 
iteratively reweighted least-squares estimator equals maximum likelihood.  
3.2 Model, results and interpretation  
Our SUR analysis concentrates on three regions: (i) the Munich area located in Bavaria; 
(ii) HesseX (most of the federal state Hesse); and (iii) other regions. Observations 
located in the Munich area are solely gross-cost contracts tendered out by the MVV. 
The batches are relatively small with a mean vkm p.a. volume of only 188,733. 
Observations located in Hesse are usually gross-cost contracts. Here, the state obligation 
to tender out almost all services and the high market volume in terms of vkm p.a. is 
expected to have a special influence.  
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Table 2: SUR results for independent variables on the adjusted price per vehicle kilometre Pi 
12 
                                               Region 
Variable 
Munich area HesseX  Other regions 
vkmpa  1.98×10
-7
 
(4.76×10
-7
) 
-1.67×10
-7
 
(1.14×10
-7
) 
-9.35×10
-8
 
(1.15×10
-7
) 
kmpervehcl -1.19×10
-5
*** 
(2.79×10
-6
) 
-7.59×10
-6
*** 
(2.75×10
-6
) 
-1.30×10
-5
*** 
(4.70×10
-6
) 
lengthbus 0.1388*** 
(0.0470) 
0.1059*** 
(0.0396) 
0.0573 
(0.0637) 
term 0.0036  
(0.0292 
-0.0513*  
(0.0303) 
-0.0219  
(0.0656) 
extopt -0.1889  
(0.2666) 
-0.1033  
(0.1412) 
0.3976  
(0.2424) 
deposit   4.2164* 
(2.4481) 
spatial -0.1855*** 
(0.0703) 
-0.1402*  
(0.0849) 
-0.2130*** 
(0.0633) 
startoyear -0.0282  
(0.0174) 
0.0539**  
(0.0250) 
0.0460  
(0.0437) 
exprsum  -0.0197*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.0013 
(0.0253) 
Constant 85.8647 
(34.6412) 
-105.1419 
(49.9640) 
-89.37328 
(86.7471) 
Observations 67 60 30 
Number of PTAs per group 1 6 9 
Significant levels: *** 99%, ** 95%,* 90%, Standard errors in parentheses 
Wald chi
2
: 5,437,55, Prob > chi
2
: 0.0000 
Source: Own calculation 
In forming the HesseX group, we correct the Hessian cases by 12 cases located in the 
Verkehrsverbund Rhein-Neckar (VRN) area and in Frankfurt on the Main (FFM) 
(HesseX excludes VRN & FFM). Different to all other areas, the VRN uses net-cost 
contracts with a high overall risk level for operators at any time and tenders out only in 
certain cases, namely if no offers to operate the requested services commercially have 
been put in place (see Beck 2010 for more details). Batches tendered out in FFM are 
characterised by comparatively high volumes (usually at least 40 vehicles), very high 
quality requirements, and long durations for submission. Furthermore, Frankfurt on the 
Main remains the only major city in Germany using tendering. Therefore the VRN 
                                                 
12 Altogether we tested 29 SUR models for the three regions presented here; Table 2 shows the results for the model 
with the best fit with respect to e.g. significance levels, number of significant variables, and pairwise pearson 
correlation between the independent variables identified. 
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cases and the FFM cases, together with all remaining observations, form the group 
Other regions. 
The results in Table 2 confirm our hypothesis that different influences are at work in 
different regions. This finding holds for both significance levels and directions of 
influences. Regarding the volume tendered out, measured by vkmpa, the results confirm 
economies of scale only on a very low and insignificant probability level of 85.9% and 
only for HesseX. We surmise it is because the average volume of a batch, which is 
633,369 vkm p.a. in HesseX (range: 61,761 to 1,839,275), is considerably higher than 
the mean volume in the Munich area of 188,732 vkm p.a. (range: 9,200 to 668,800), but 
not high enough to be meaningful. On the other hand such an influence might not exist 
at all, for example, due to the contrary effects of overhead or administrative costs, or 
might be too low compared to other factors of influence presented in the following 
section. For Other regions the low number of observations might be a reason for an 
insignificant result. 
One clear finding for all three groups is that a higher productivity, measured by the 
average vkmpa per bus (variable kmpervehcl), lowers the price significantly. The results 
show that operator ability to optimise circulation plans, blocks, and schedules 
(minimisation of dead mileage), based on the conditions set by PTAs (timetable, 
direction of lines, etc.), significantly impacts prices.   
Regarding risk, several findings confirm that a higher risk level increases the price to be 
expected by PTAs, presumably due to the higher risk premia to be calculated by 
bidders. A first finding is that an increase in the average height of investment risk per 
bus, measured by lengthbus, has a price-increasing impact on Pi. This result is highly 
significant only for the Munich area and HesseX. Obviously, larger buses expose the 
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operator to higher investment risks and they also imply higher investments and 
depreciations. Furthermore, the longer the bus lengths the higher the cost of 
maintenance. 
For the contract term, where we assume a price-decreasing impact with respect to 
depreciation possibilities and the level of risk at the end of the contract period due to the 
remaining resale value (resale risk at market exit), a significant result is confirmed only 
for HesseX. For the Munich area the low volume per batch probably limits such risk in 
the view of the operators. For Other regions the limited variation in this variable 
(contract term: 5 to 8 years, compared to 3 to 8 years, for example, for HesseX) could 
prevent any significant results.  
As discussed in Section 2.3, we assumed that the option for PTAs to extend the contract 
term has a price-increasing impact, but we find an insignificant level of probability of 
89.9% only for the Other regions data. Due to the fact that usually the price fixed for 
the first treaty year is also used for the optional years (adjusted by the usual price index 
only), operators claim they must add a risk premium. They also claim they can only 
calculate the main contract term (excluding the extension option) since this is the only 
fixed and calculable period. Hence, adding an extension option has no price-decreasing 
effect, although the depreciation period could be extended. Nevertheless, with respect to 
quality delivered the option is generally assumed to have positive incentivising effects.  
The significant result for deposit for Other regions confirms again that increasing the 
risk for operators, here via a higher security deposit, has an increasing influence on 
price. For this variable, we note that a missing variation for the Munich area and a very 
low variation for HesseX (only two observations with little differing values) impeded an 
admission of deposit into the SUR-model for the two groups.  
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In addition to contractual conditions influencing the price there are several structural 
variables beyond a PTA‟s influence that effect Pi. The results for the spatial type of 
service show a significant decreasing influence for the gross-costs per vkm for all the 
regions analysed here. An increasing population density therefore increases Pi, for 
example, due to a lower average speed per bus in city areas. Furthermore, several labour 
agreements foresee a mark-up for employees in urban areas (see, for example, ver.di 
hessen 2007).  
The coefficient for the start year of operations (variable startoyear) has the expected 
positive sign, although only significant for HesseX, meaning that prices are increasing 
over time. Market participants in Hesse have claimed that the low prices realised by 
PTAs during the starting phase of competitive tendering were set at strategic levels by 
global players or were miscalculated. Some cases of the winner‟s curse became public 
since (see Beck 2009b and 2010). BSL (2008) has also mentioned that quality 
requirements have become more ambitious over time in the Frankfurt on the Main area 
in Hesse, which also could have led to increased costs. 
Unlike Hesse, prices in the Munich area show a decreasing trend, but insignificant on a 
low level of probability of 89.5%, despite a clear increase in quality standards (since 
2002 almost all procedures require new vehicles and a 100% low floor and air 
conditioning share). Most likely, the increasing experience level of the MVV over time 
enabled a gradual reduction of prices since the MVV is the only PTA in our database 
that has conducted more than 23 tendering procedures (MVV-sum: 67). Furthermore the 
high level of 98% pair wise Pearson correlation with startoyear impeded an admission 
of expr into our SUR model. 
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Finally, analysing the sum of experience of a PTA (the sum of all procedures per PTA 
until 2009, variable exprsum) confirms that a high level of experience of a specific PTA 
lowers the price. A high market volume with recurring opportunities for operators in a 
specific region, compared with an increasing experience share for operators, might also 
affect the price. This result is highly significant only for HesseX, but is remarkable since 
startoyear has a positive impact. The Munich area with only one PTA could not be 
analysed due to the missing variation.  
 
4.0 Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
4.1 Methodology  
So far we have only looked at cost differences due to structural differences, either fully 
set by external circumstances or set by the transport authorities. Cost differences can 
also be caused by the inefficiency of bus service providers and the overcompensation 
due to a low level of competition. These cost differences are not identical for all firms 
and operating areas, but are individually specified by, for example, poor bus utilisation, 
excess labour, gold-plating, etc.
13
 
The two main methods of scientific efficiency analysis are non-parametric data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and the parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA).
14
 
We choose to rely on SFA for two reasons. First, since SFA and SUR are both 
regression techniques, SFA is much more comparable with SUR than with DEA. For 
SFA and SUR, we can interpret and compare coefficients and their impacts on 
dependent variables. Second, the significance of impacts for both can be evaluated by 
                                                 
13 When we bear in mind that the winner in a competitive tendering is still the best offer in the market, these 
inefficiencies occur for all bidders. 
14 See Coelli et al. (2005) for a profound introduction to efficiency analysis. 
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looking at standard errors of the estimations. This is not possible with DEA, because 
DEA only looks at the efficiency of observations and does not assume a functional 
relationship between output and input. In other words, it is impossible to interpret the 
impacts of structural variables.  
The concept of SFA was introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977) in a cross-sectional model.
15
 It is a regression technique that estimates a 
best-practice efficiency frontier in contrast to average curves set by traditional 
econometrics. In a cost framework, the estimated equation can be written as  
iiii uvxFP  0ln  (4) 
where FPi represents the full price per annum to be paid by the PTA to the operator 
for the i-th batch, α0  is an estimated intercept, and xi  is a vector of explanatory 
variables with coefficient vector β. The stochastic term is given by a batch-specific error 
part vi, which is independently and identically distributed following a normal 
distribution ),0(~ 2vi iidv  , and a batch-specific, non-negative, inefficiency 
component, which is independently and identically distributed following a half-normal 
distribution ),0(~ 2vi iidv 
 . The vector of explanatory variables usually includes 
outputs, factor prices and control variables, so that the resulting inefficiency component 
can be interpreted as cost inefficiency. Absent information on firm-specific input factor 
prices, we can only calculate the measure called „technical cost efficiency‟ by Jamasb et 
al. (2008) in their study on productivity of US gas transmission companies.
16
 To ensure 
a homoscedastic distribution of inefficiencies, the costs and explanatory variables are 
introduced in logarithms according to the Cobb-Douglas functional form. The 
                                                 
15 Given that only twelve second-round batches are included in our data set, we are not able to analyse recurrent 
tender rounds, and cannot make use of more sophisticated SFA panel data models. 
16 A similar approach  was taken by Agrell et al. (2008a, b) on the incentive regulation of German gas and electricity 
distribution companies.  
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inefficiency component is separated from the stochastic error term by applying the 
Jondrow et al. (1982) estimator.  
Generally, cost functions in efficiency analysis of the local public transport sector are 
estimated with firm-level data assuming a cost-minimizing behaviour (see, for example, 
Farsi (2006)). In our approach, we look at the efficiency of winning offerings in public 
tenderings chosen from a set of competing offerings, which can amplify the cost-
minimizing provision and easily reveal the appearance of over-compensation in the 
inefficiency component. We assume that FPi represents the total costs of the transport 
firm for providing the tendered services per annum, acknowledging that these services 
may only represent a portion of the firm‟s business, plus an adequate profit. We observe 
that firms winning more than one batch can appear more than once in our dataset. 
However, each batch has to be calculated as its own imaginary subsidiary, because 
contractual lengths can differ and the potential economies of scale are hence uncertain. 
This is particularly valid for the newcomers that win 73% of all batches in our database.  
4.2 SFA-results and interpretation  
We confirm that increasing the productivity per vehicle per batch as measured by 
kmpervehcl decreases the full price to be paid per annum on a highly significant level. 
We also identify the influence for the variable declwage, which shows that tendering 
conditions that require operators to use any or even a specific labour agreement have a 
significant price-increasing effect. Matters of risk are confirmed to have a price-
increasing effect. As presented in Section 3.2, the variable lengthbus as a measure for 
the relative investment risk per bus again has a highly significant price-increasing 
effect. Surprisingly, tendering conditions that make it necessary for operators to renew 
the fleet during the contract, for example, due to a maximum age of vehicles that is 
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below the contract term, show no significant influence. It is likely that the amount of 
maintaining costs has a high influence, balancing out the risk of realising a selling price 
that is below the book value of the vehicle at the point of renewal. 
Another relevant aspect is revenue risk as measured by the variable revrisk on a 
significant level. As expected, imposing an additional risk on the operators via net-cost 
contracts seems to increase the price. 
Table 3: SFA results
17
  
 Dependent variable  ln(FPi) 
ln(vkmpa)   0.9674***(0.0163) 
ln(kmpervehcl)  -0.2561***(0.0331) 
declwage  0.0400*(0.0218) 
ln(lengthbus)  0.5545***(0.1309) 
renewal  -0.0413(0.0356) 
revrisk  0.1064*(0.0592) 
Ln(submdays)  0.0932*(0.0545) 
spatial  -0.0748***(0.0151) 
Constant  15.3464***(0.5779) 
Observations  157 
Significant levels: *** 99%, * 90%, Standard errors in parentheses, ln: logarithm natural. 
Source: Own calculation 
Surprisingly, and not as expected in Section 2.3, the variable submdays shows a price- 
increasing influence. Increasing the period between the date of the public call for 
tenders and the date to submit bids tends to increase the full price to be paid by the PTA 
per annum. It appears as though operators calculate more aggressively when there is a 
short period for submission. If there is a longer period to prepare bids, operators are able 
to perform more sophisticated calculations which could enable them to identify more 
uncertainties where a risk premium appears necessary, thus preventing the occurrence of 
a winner's curse. Furthermore, a short submission period induces the danger that bidders 
                                                 
17 Altogether we tested 45 efficiency models, while Table 3 shows the results for the model with the best fit with 
respect to e.g. significance levels, number of significant variables, pairwise pearson correlation between the 
independent variables identified and sigma u. 
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miscalculate. Both cases may be problematical for PTAs should operators go bankrupt 
and services must be interrupted.  
When comparing the efficiency levels Kruskal-Wallis tests confirm on a 91.05% 
significance level that batches tendered out in the federal state of Hesse (including FFM 
and the VRN area) show 0.25% less efficiency, on average, than procedures conducted 
elsewhere (see Table 4).  
Table 4: Efficiency comparisons and Kruskal-Wallis tests 
Non-Hesse vs. Hesse  
Mean efficiency for Non Hesse (n = 85)  89.15% 
Mean efficiency for Hesse (n = 72)  88.90% 
χ1
2
-value 2.883 
Probability 91.05% 
expr < 6 vs.  expr > 6  
Mean efficiency for expr < 6 (n = 45) 88.38% 
Mean efficiency for expr > 6 (n = 112)  89.30% 
χ1
2
-value 4.443 
Probability 96.50% 
n: number of observations per group 
Source: Own calculation 
Comparing the mean prices of the different regions analysed as shown in Figure 3 
reveal that on the other hand prices in Hesse are somewhat lower. We conclude that 
PTAs in Hesse probably tender out batches that enable lower prices than elsewhere 
(Non-Hesse) due to a low level of risk (for example, usually gross-cost contracts) and 
good productivity parameters (with respect to kmpervehcl or vkmpa). 
The values in Figure 3 also show that, on average, the lowest prices are realised in the 
Munich area which is only slightly different to Hesse. Nevertheless, the result shows 
that producing services in Hesse is a little less-efficient than elsewhere due to factors 
not included in SFA. One explanation could be the lack of competition due to 
diminishing bidders per procedure and the trend to market consolidation observed in 
recent years in Hesse (see Beck 2010). A lack of competition due to oligopoly structures 
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may then be a reason for overcompensating the winning bidder. With respect to the 
price-increasing effect over time shown for HesseX discussed in Section 3.2 we suggest 
examining whether the weak difference in the efficiency levels observed will become 
more distinctive in the near future.  
Figure 3: Distribution of prices per vkm in € for the regional groups  
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Source: Own calculation 
Regarding the experience level as measured by the variable expr, SFA reveals that 
PTAs‟ experience has an efficiency-increasing impact. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
confirms on a 96.50% significance level a 0.93% increase in the efficiency scale for 
procedures where PTAs have already conducted at least six tenders. The results show 
that an experience level higher than six tenders enables PTAs to set tendering conditions 
such that operators are able to deliver more efficient services. In testing numerous other 
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variables like revrisk, deposit, bidders and, startoyear, we found that none show 
significant differences in the mean efficiency levels.
18, 19
  
 
5.0 Conclusion  
Based on a comprehensive data set of 157 observations and a detailed adjustment of 
price data with respect to the price differences between states due to peculiarities 
beyond the influence of PTAs, we identified three groups of impact factors on tender 
prices. These are the contract conditions set by the PTAs with direct influence on 
operator productivity; contract conditions set by PTAs with direct influence on the risk 
level for operators; and exogenous aspects beyond the influence of PTAs. Using SUR 
analysis and SFA analysis we identified numerous impact factors that partially differed 
among the regions due to specifics such as the level of experience and the tendering 
philosophy.  
Based on our results, we conclude that properly setting the contract conditions for a 
given batch allows PTAs to realise added efficiency improvements. Directly, the 
improvements occur by contract conditions increasing productivity per batch and 
limiting the risk level assumed by the operator, and indirectly, by conditions increasing 
the level of competition. For example, optimisation of bus utilisation has a cost-
decreasing impact, confirming that PTAs are able to reduce prices with adequate 
transport and (line) network planning. We suggest that PTAs should determine contract 
conditions in a manner that enables operators to improve productivity and minimize 
                                                 
18 We only see with a low probability of 82.30% that services won by small- and medium-sized enterprises show a 
0.35% higher efficiency scale than services won by other operators, and that cases with a change of the operator show 
a 0.44% higher efficiency scale than other services with a low probability of 81.90%, indicating that further research 
is necessary for these two aspects. 
19 We also tried to include the variables turning out to be significant efficiency separators in the Kruskal-Wallis tests 
as heteroscedastic variables in the inefficiency function. However, this does not lead to significant coefficients.  
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their risk premia. Moreover, the result that an increasing level of experience has a price-
decreasing impact may enable further efficiency gains by assigning the tendering 
process to one ore more overarching authorities per region vested with the expertise 
required.  
Nevertheless, even such actions by PTAs are limited by exogenous factors that are 
outside their sphere of influence of PTAs, such as population density, or political aims, 
such as the aim to prevent dumping-wages for fair market conditions and social reasons. 
Furthermore several trade-offs have to be kept in mind. A major one is that net-cost 
contracts entail a higher risk level, but are generally preferable to gross-cost contracts 
with respect to incentives (see Beck 2011 for more details). 
When looking at the different results for price developments over time for the regions 
Hesse and the Munich area, further research is necessary whether strategic prices or 
even a market consolidation might have an influence. This holds especially with respect 
to the efficiency level, which shows slightly less efficient prices in Hesse than 
elsewhere and though requires confirmation by future examinations.  
Furthermore, efficiency studies usually reveal a cost reduction because of technological 
progress of around 1 per cent per year (e.g. Walter (2010)). This has to be kept in mind 
when analysing prices over time and could be included in further research.   
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Appendix 
Table 5: OLS regression of the number of bidders on price  
 Dependent variable Pi 
Bidders  -0.0612*** 
(0.0137) 
Constant 2.4167*** 
(0.0828) 
Observations 157 
F-value 19.79 
Prob>F 0.0000 
R
2
 0.1132 
Significant level: *** 99%, Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 6: List of main criteria 
declwage Minimum standard with respect to labour agreements as 
set by PTA with three occurrences: (i) no requirements, 
(ii) closure of any labour agreement with employees 
required, (iii) specific labour agreement set as a minimum 
standard 
Ordinal Number 
Variable  Explanation Scale of 
measure-
ment 
Measured by 
pi Price per vehicle kilometre (vkm) to be paid by the PTA 
to the operator for batch i in the first contract year as a 
result of competitive tendering on a gross-cost basis. 
Note that net-cost contracts were made comparable to 
gross-cost contracts by using their net subsidy payment 
plus the fare revenues of that batch 
Ratio € per vkm 
Pi  pi, adjusted by the effect of inflation (inflation measured 
by the real development of the operating costs) and other 
major impacts that affect the price over time (for 
example, adjustment of public co-funding for vehicle 
investments) 
Ratio € per vkm 
batch Lot: the smallest part of a network tendered out for which 
a bidder is able to hand in an offer 
Nominal 1 
FPi  Full price to be paid by the PTA per annum (p.a.) to the 
operator per batch i: FPi = Pi × sum of vkm p.a. per 
batch i 
Ratio € per batch 
p.a. 
vkmpa  Vehicle kilometres (vkm) p.a. per batch within the first 
year of operations. Note that we count only those vkm 
p.a. provided on the specific lines according to the 
timetable of the batch usually set by the PTA; other tours, 
e.g., transfer between depot and start of a specific line, 
are excluded 
Ratio Kilometres 
per batch p.a. 
linesno Number of lines per batch Interval Number 
novehcl Number of vehicles per batch Interval Number 
kmpervehcl Vehicle kilometres per annum per vehicle in a specific 
batch on average 
Ratio Kilometres 
per annum 
per vehicle 
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lengthbus Average length per vehicle in a specific batch on average Ratio Meters 
term Contract term in years per batch Interval Years 
deposit Deposit which needs to be given to PTAs by operators as 
a security (security deposit) in percent of FPi  
Ratio Percentage 
submdays The duration between the date of the public call for 
tenders and the date of submission as set by PTAs (days 
of submission) 
Interval Days 
extopt Option for PTA for term extension foreseen at the end of 
the contract term? Yes = 1, no = 0 
Dummy Yes/No 
renewal Do contract conditions exist that presuppose a renewal of 
vehicles during the contract period? Yes = 1, no = 0 
Dummy Yes/No 
revrisk Does the operator have to bear the revenue risk? Yes = 1 
(classified as net-cost contract), no = 0 (classified as 
gross-cost contract) 
Dummy Yes/No 
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Variable  Explanation Scale of 
measure-
ment 
Measured by 
 
expr Experience of the PTA that has put out the batch to 
tender, measured by the specific number of the current 
batch tendered out by the PTA over time 
Interval Number 
exprsum Experience of the PTA that has put out the batch to 
tender, measured by the sum of all batches tendered out 
by the PTA 
Interval Number 
startoyear Year of start of operations Interval Year 
bidders Number of bidders per batch Interval Number 
change Has a change of the operator occurred due to the specific 
tender? Yes = 1, no = 0. 
Dummy Yes/No 
sme Is the winning bidder a small or medium-sized enterprise 
(SME)? Yes = 1, no = 0. 
Dummy Yes/No 
spatial Spatial type to assess population density measured by 
five agglomeration types: (i) major city, (ii) medium-
sized town, (iii) small town, (iv) suburban area, (v) rural 
area 
Ordinal Number 
fedstate Abbreviation of the federal state where the batch is 
(primarily) located: BW: Baden-Württemberg, BY: 
Bavaria, HE: Hesse, NW: North Rhine-Westphalia, RP: 
Rhineland-Palatine and SH: Schleswig-Holstein. 
Nominal Abbreviation 
 31 
References  
Agrell, P. J., Bogetoft, P., Cullmann, A., Hirschhausen, C. v., Neumann, A., and Walter, 
M. (2008a): Projekt GERNER IV Ergebnisdokumentation: Bestimmung der 
Effizienzwerte Verteilernetzbetreiber Gas, [online]. Available at 
<http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/14563.pdf>, [Accessed 10 July 
2009]. 
Agrell, P. J., Bogetoft, P., Cullmann, A., Hirschhausen, C. v., Neumann, A., and Walter, 
M. (2008b): Projekt GERNER IV Ergebnisdokumentation: Bestimmung der 
Effizienzwerte Verteilernetzbetreiber Strom, [online]. Available at 
<http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/14693.pdf>, [Accessed 10 July 
2009]. 
Aigner, D., C.A.K. Lovell, and P. Schmidt (1977): „Formulation and Estimation of 
Stochastic Frontier Production Function Models‟, Journal of Econometrics, 6(1), 
21-37. 
Alexandersson, G., S. Hultén, and S. Fölster (1998): „The Effects of Competition in 
Swedish Local Bus Services‟, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 32(2), 
203-219. 
Augustin, K., and M. Walter (2009): „Operator Changes through Competitive 
Tendering: Empirical Evidence from German Local Bus Transport‟, Research in 
Transportation Economics, forthcoming. 
Beck, A. (2009a): „The distinction between commercial and non-commercial bus 
services in Germany: Given by nature?‟, Berlin University of Technology – 
Center for Network Industries & Infrastructure, CNI-Working Paper, 2009-01, 
[online]. Available at <http://www.wip.tu-berlin.de/typo3/index.php?id=2971>, 
[Accessed 16 March  2010]. 
Beck, A. (2009b): „To tender or not to tender – The unanswered German question‟, 
Berlin University of Technology – Center for Network Industries & 
Infrastructure, CNI-Working Paper, 2009-02, [online]. Available at 
<http://www.wip.tu-berlin.de/typo3/ index.php?id=2971>, [Accessed 16 March  
2010]. 
Beck, A. (2010): „Experiences with Competitive Tendering of Bus Services in 
Germany‟, Transport Reviews, forthcoming. Online as iFirst article already 
available at <http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/01441647.2010.511299>, 
[Accessed 11 December 2010]. 
Beck, A. (2011): „Barriers to Entry in Rail Passenger Services: Empirical Evidence for 
Tendering Procedures in Germany‟, European Journal of Transport and 
Infrastructure Research, 11(1), 20-41.  
Brons, M., P. Nijkamp, E. Pels and P. Rietveld (2005): „Efficiency of Urban Public 
Transit: A Meta Analysis‟, Transportation, 32(1), 1-21. 
Coelli, T.J., D.S.P. Rao, C. J. O‟Donnell and G. E. Battese (2005): An Introduction to 
Efficiency and Productivity Analysis, Springer, New York, 2nd edn. 
Dalen, D.M. and A. Gómez-Lobo (2003): „Yardsticks on the road: Regulatory contracts 
and cost efficiency in the Norwegian bus industry‟, Transportation 30(4), 371-
386. 
 32 
Farsi, M., M. Filippini and M. Kuenzle (2006): „Cost Efficiency in Regional Bus 
Companies: An Application of Alternative Stochastic Frontier Models‟, Journal 
of Transport Economics and Policy, 40(1), 95-118. 
Hensher, D. A., and I. P. Wallis (2005): „Competitive Tendering as a Contracting 
Mechanism for Subsidising Transport: The Bus Experience‟, Journal of 
Transport Economics and Policy, 39(3), 295-322. 
Jamasb, T., M.G. Pollitt, and T. Triebs (2008): „Productivity and efficiency of US gas 
transmission companies: A European regulatory perspective‟, Energy Policy, 
Elsevier, 36(9), 3398-3412. 
Jondrow, J., C.A.K. Lovell, I.S. Materov, and P. Schmidt (1982): „On the Estimation of 
Technical Inefficiency in the Stochastic Frontier Production Model‟, Journal of 
Econometrics, 19(2-3), 233-238. 
McDowell, A. (2004): „From the help desk: Seemingly unrelated regression with 
unbalanced equations‟, The Stata Journal, 4(4), 442-448. 
Meeusen, W., and J. van den Broeck (1977): „Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-
Douglas Production Functions with Composed Error‟, International Economic 
Review, 18(2), 435-444. 
Miller, D. (1970): „Differences Among Cities, Differences Among Firms, and Costs of 
Urban Bus Transport‟, The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1, 22-32. 
Sharaby, N., and Y. Shiftan (2008): „The Economic Benefits from Competition in Bus 
Public Transport – The Israeli Case‟, International Journal of Transport 
Economics, 2/2008, 391-413. 
ver.di hessen – Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft Landesbezirk Hessen (2007): 
Tarifverträge: Entgelte und Ausbildungsvergütungen für die Arbeitnehmerinnen 
und Arbeitnehmer des privaten Personenverkehrs mit Omnibussen in Hessen 
(LHO), Frankfurt on the Main, valid from 1.10.2007. 
Walter, M. (2010): „Some Determinants of Cost Efficiency in German Local Public 
Transport‟, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, forthcoming. 
Wolanski, M. (2009): „How much do we save on competitive tendering? Quantitative 
study of polish cities' experience‟, in Nash, C., M. Wolanski, W. Veeneman, and 
D. van de Velde (eds.) Benchmarking the competitive tendering outcome – 
Proceeding of the Eleventh International Conference on Competition and 
Ownership in Land Passenger Transport, Next Generation Infrastructures 
Foundation, Delft, 233-248. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Zellner, A. (1962): „An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions and Tests for Aggregation Bias‟, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, LVII (June, 1962), 348-68. 
 
 
 
No. 13
No. 12
No. 11
No. 10
No. 9
No. 8
No. 7
No. 6
No. 5
No. 4
Arne Beck and Matthias Walter: Tender prices in local bus transport in 
Germany - an application of alternative regression techniques, December 
2010
Eike B. Kroll, Holger Müller and Bodo Vogt: Experimental evidence of 
context-dependent preferences in risk-free settings, November 2010
Siegfried Berninghaus, Werner Güth and Stephan Schosser: Voluntary 
contributing in a neighborhood public good game - an experimental 
study, November 2010
Axel Schaffer, Léopold Simar and Jan Rauland: Decomposing regional 
efficiency, October 2010
Tobias Lindner: Das Bundestagswahlrecht aus Perspektive der Social 
Choice-Theorie, October 2010
Andranik S. Tangian: Decision making in politics and economics: 4. Bun-
destag elections 2009 and direct democracy, October 2010
Martin Ruckes and Thomas Rønde: Dynamic incentives in organizations: 
success and inertia, October 2010
Siegfried Berninghaus, Sven Haller, Tyll Krüger, Thomas Neumann, 
Stephan Schosser, Bodo Vogt: Risk attitude, beliefs, and information in 
a corruption game – An experimental analysis, September 2010
Ingrid Ott, Susanne Soretz: On the role of productive government 
spendings for convergence of a growing economy with heterogenous 
specialists, August 2010
Anna Chernobai, Christian Menn, Svetlozar T. Rachev, Stefan Trück: 
Estimation of operational value-at-risk in the presence of minimum 
collection threshold: An empirical study, August 2010
recent issues
Working Paper Series in Economics
The responsibility for the contents of the working papers rests with the author, not the Institute. Since working papers 
are of a preliminary nature, it may be useful to contact the author of a particular working paper about results or ca-
veats before referring to, or quoting, a paper. Any comments on working papers should be sent directly to the author.
